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Introduction
In 1993, the United States Congressional Committee on the Judiciary announced 
that one of the greatest threats to American security was fifteen year old boys.1
According to the Committee, boys were being brainwashed by an insidious network of 
coordinated media institutions, and trained to become an army of killers.  Piped directly 
into the suburban home, often without parents even knowing, destructive messages and 
instructions were corrupting the hearts and minds of America’s future, and the ensuing 
chaos could only be prevented by swift Governmental action. The threat was the arcade 
game Mortal Kombat and there was neither ensuing chaos nor swift governmental action, 
but there were and continue to be dire predictions about the effect of violent 
entertainment on American male youth.
These public debates and legislative controls to suppress violent visual content are 
actions by which cultures imagine themselves in terms of their relationship to aggression 
and violence.  Censorship measures are tools by which cultures can articulate or redefine 
their standards.  Violent media which trigger these debates and legislation, like Mortal 
Kombat, represent fissures between a culture’s idea of itself and its actual interests, moral 
standards, and behavior.  That fissure often occurs along age lines, with an older 
generation attempting to influence the attitudes and behaviors of a younger generation 
through the restriction of violent images.
Debates about violent entertainment have argued that it is the violent image itself 
that causes aggressive behavior.  If violent content is causing fifteen year olds to kill each 
other, then the full pressures of all of the social institutions should be brought to bear to 
1 Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, Serial No. J-103-37, testimony by Sen. 
Joseph Lieberman, Eugene F. Provenzo, Marilyn Droz.
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address the problem.  However, in most of the cases examine here, media content was 
used as a scapegoat for deeper social problems.
Not all violent images are always appropriate for all audiences, but there is 
nothing good or bad about images themselves.  As the Hays Production Code (1930) 
states:
It has often been argued that art itself is unmoral, neither good nor bad.  This is 
true of the THING which is music, painting, poetry, etc.  But the THING is the 
PRODUCT of some person’s mind, and the intention of that mind was either good 
or bad morally when it produced the thing.  Besides, the thing has its EFFECT 
upon those who come into contact with it.  In both these ways, that is, as a product 
of a mind and the cause of definite effects, it has a deep moral significance and 
unmistakable moral quality.2
That moral significance is assigned and evaluated by both observers and censors, often in 
very different ways.. The artistic context of a violent image and the social context of the 
viewer affect the understanding of the depicted act: a gunshot wound functions 
differently in a soap opera than a film like Black Hawk Down or a video game like Doom , 
and a seven year old child, a surgeon, and a police officer will react to the images
differently.  
Decisions to render any image as obscene or appropriate are cultural choices.  A 
sense of social identity is created, defined, and supported by what images are permissible. 
Although this thesis will primarily focus on images meant for entertainment, the same is 
true of depictions of actual violence and its effects: restrictions have been placed on
pictures of the coffins of U.S. servicemen, the newspaper accounts of the burned bodies 
2 Quoted in Stephen Prince, Classical Film Violence: Designing and Regulating Brutality in Hollywood 
Cinema, 1930-1968, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 297.
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of American contractors in Fallujah, and photographs of torture in the U.S. Army prison 
at Abu-Gharib.3  All three are actual, factual events, and were rendered inappropriate.  
Censorship creates the problem it attempts to solve.  If there is nothing inherently 
moral or immoral about a particular image then any assigned moral value is unstable – it 
can be defined differently for different populations at different times.  The act of 
censoring violent images makes them bad, rather than describes a natural bad-ness.  The 
emergence of new media throughout the twentieth century, particularly film, television,
and electronic games, confronted lawmakers and parents with new challenges, forcing 
constant redefinitions of the boundaries of acceptable content.  I will focus on five 
specific moments when controls were publicly discussed and legally imposed: 
 Sims Act, 1912 and the Supreme Court case Mutual v. Ohio, 1915
 Hays Motion Picture Production Code, 1930 
 National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1968 and 
the Surgeon General’s follow-up Report, 1971
 Joint Hearings on Video Game Ratings, 1993
 Reports of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Surgeon General’s 
Office, 1999
Each of the five moments led to an evolution or elaboration of an apparatus of control,
the redefinition and reinforcement of institutional authority over visual subjects.
Of these five, only the Hays Production Code was actually successful at 
controlling content for all general audiences. The other four legislative efforts only 
suggested restrictions on certain subjects for certain audiences, but those films, shows, 
3 Nicholas Berg, “New Technology Loosens Controls Over Images of War,” in The New York Times,  May 
14, 2004, A.12.
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and games were already in circulation.  Partially this is because the Hays Code controlled 
films at their source, the production studios.  Each of the other efforts was designed to 
control audiences by dividing them: television developed subscription cable to carry its 
explicit content, and video games are regulated by an age-based rating system that 
categorizes but does not censor.  I will examine these efforts to dictate who can see what 
images, and the conditions that cause social bodies or individuals to decide they need to 
control visual content.
Because I see the hand of hegemony in the media violence debates, and the 
emphasis has been on seeing violence, as opposed to reading about it or listening to it, I 
will employ Allen Feldman’s notion of a scopic regime as a theoretical lens.  Feldman 
defines the scopic regime as “the agendas and techniques of political visualization: the 
regimens that prescribe modes of seeing and visual objects, and which proscribe or render 
untenable other modes and objects of perception.”4 A scopic regime is any body that 
regulates visual content in order to define and reinforce cultural standards or to regulate 
and police behavior. Using Feldman’s idea I hope to show the continuity of the apparatus 
of control, even as new media challenged the methods of regulation, and the creation of 
an authorized canon of visual subjects.
The 1999 Judiciary hearings defined “media violence” as a pervasive problem 
that could not be addressed by regulating television, music, films, the internet, and video 
games individually.  This paper will continue this trend and bring together theories of 
violence from different media to compare them, and begin to examine the individual 
debates as representing a social, artistic, and political movement rather than as unique 
4 Allen Feldman, “Violence and Vision: The Prosthetics and Aesthetics of Terror,” in Violence and 
Subjectivity, ed. Veena Das, et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 49.
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instances.  While there are a number of articles and books that isolate examples of 
censorship and explore their political overtones, which I will use throughout this paper, 
no one has yet put multimedia violence debates into a broad, unified historical 
perspective, and traced the evolution of control through the emergence of mass electronic 
media.  This paper cannot possibly be that work, but I hope to show that it can be done 
and is worth consideration.
The history of social concern about violence as entertainment is too long for this 
single paper.  The vast scope of material considered potentially dangerous is likewise 
daunting, even if limited to just visual media.  I will focus on the twentieth-century 
concern about the depiction of violence in performance-based media in the United 
States.5 My use of the term “images” throughout this paper refers to dynamic images of 
movement: television, theatre, film, and video games.  
It is also necessary to separate violent entertainment from the spectacle of real 
violence.  I will not consider the work of artists who use actual physical pain or violence 
in their art, or the spectacle of violence that pervades contact sports and televised news 
programs, but will focus on fictional and simulated violence.  The exception to this will 
be films of boxer Jack Johnson, which were instrumental in the creation of national 
censorship boards, and therefore relevant to my discussion.
This thesis is divided into three sections: first, a history of legislative actions against 
violent entertainment; second, an analysis of the scientific studies of media violence and 
aggression, and their relationship to legislative action; and finally an examination of the 
relationship between media violence and real-world violence.
5 Allowing that the term “performative” can be attached to other visual forms that have been criticized for 
violent content, including comic books, graphic novels, and pulp men’s magazines and fiction, I will 
restrict my consideration to media of motion: television, motion pictures, theatre, and video games.
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Chapter 1
The Sims Act and Mutual v. Ohio
The origins of the legal control of violent media in the United States were the
1912 Sims Act in Congress and the 1915 Supreme Court case Mutual Film Corporation 
v. Industrial Commission of Ohio. Both were concerned with the transportation of films 
across state lines, and the two actions together created a legal definition for an emerging
art form that implied the power of local and national governments to control its content.
Cinema emerged as a new entertainment in the 1890s, first in the form of 
nickelodeons and soon after as an urban public event.  In 1907 Chicago passed an 
ordinance requiring all movie houses to be licensed, and in 1908 the mayor of New York
went a step further and attempted to shut down all movie houses.6  The new medium was 
being closely observed by political, religious, and social organizations.  University of 
Houston communications professor Garth Jowett proposes three reasons why it deserved 
the attention:
First…once the medium gained in popularity and began to attract the patronage of 
the middle classes, it became more symbolic of the loss of control over the 
socialization of the child being experienced by the Protestant hegemony.
…
Second, the movie houses were highly visible and permanent targets, easily 
identified, and unlike many other social ills, subject to direct pressure from 
authorities in the form of legislation and licensing, even though it took several 
years for specific legislation to be passed that dealt adequately with problems 
such as lighting, ventilation, fire regulations, and sanitary conditions.
…
Third, there was a great deal of suspicion concerning the ethnic origins of some of 
the filmmakers, especially after the first decade of the industry.7
6 Garth Jowett, “’A Capacity for Evil’: The 1915 Supreme Court Mutual Decision,” in Controlling 
Hollywood ed. Matthew Bernstein (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1999), 21-23.
7 Jowett, 20.  Throughout his chapter on the ways government regulations rendered film into a business 
rather than an art form, Bernstein reinforces the definition he is trying to critique by repeatedly referring to 
the film “industry.”
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Such concern was important because the format and content of cinema were still being 
established.  Audiences in metropolitan cities in the first decade of the twentieth century 
were seeing a mix of recorded vaudeville routines, documentary news shorts, and the 
emergence of narrative film, all distributed widely and rapidly.
The Mutual Film Company was a clearinghouse for newsreels and documentary 
shorts.  With a home base in Detroit, Michigan, Mutual rented films to movie houses 
throughout the country. The Industrial Commission of Ohio declared that it had the right 
to examine and potentially censor any film entering the state, and charge a fee for the 
service.  Mutual sued Ohio, arguing three points: that censorship “imposes an unlawful 
burden on interstate commerce; it violates the freedom of speech and publication granted 
by 11, article 1, of the Constitution of the state of Ohio; and it attempts to delegate 
legislative power to censors and to other boards…”8  Because the legal definition of film 
itself was being negotiated, the case moved through the judicial system to the United 
States Supreme Court, where contesting definitions of “film” offered by the producers 
and the regulators were presented.
Mutual argued that films were records, and invoked the right to freedom of 
expression by likening the medium to the documentary press.  
[Films] depict dramatizations of standard novels, exhibiting many subjects of 
scientific interest, the properties of matter, the growth of the various forms of 
animal and plant life, and explorations and travels; also events of historical and 
current interest - the same events which are described in words and by 
photographs in newspapers, weekly periodicals, magazines, and other 
publications, of which photographs and promptly secured a few days after the 
events which they depict happen…nothing is depicted of a harmful or immoral 
character.9
8 236 U.S. 230, 5.
9 ibid
8
The Court interpreted the First Amendment to refer only to Congressional action, 
and allowed the possibility of states to individually limit the press and speech.  Ohio’s 
censorship policy stated that “only such films as are, in the judgment and discretion of the 
board of censors, of a moral, educational, or amusing and harmless character shall be 
passed and approved by such board.”10  If Mutual was only producing moral films, 
Justice Joseph McKenna argued in the Court’s majority decision, there was no conflict 
with speech protection clauses found in either the state or national Constitutions. 
The problem was that Mutual was not distributing harmless films.  The films that 
figured in Mutual v. Ohio were newsreels of the black boxer Jack Johnson defeating a 
series of Great White Hopes: Tommy Burns in 1908, Stanley Ketchel in 1909, Jim 
Jeffries in 1910 and Jim Flynn in 1912.  Johnson’s victories over all of his opponents lead 
to an escalating concern on the part of church groups and local governments about how 
and where the visual records of these events would be exhibited.
Race relations, focused by the metaphor of the boxing ring, were at the heart of 
both the white and black publics’ reactions to the films.  Johnson’s initial victory over 
Burns was not as important as his retention of the championship title: once was a fluke, 
but twice was a challenge, and three successful defenses of the title “confronted white 
viewers with an historically unprecedented image of black power.”11  Film audiences 
grew with each new fight/film, and as the fights took on increased cultural capital, 
Johnson was able to manipulate his image through the films.12  Posing for the camera, 
10 236 U.S. 230, 5.
11 Dan Streible, “Race and the Reception of Jack Johnson Fight Films,” in The Birth of Whiteness: Race 




often mid-fight, Johnson’s smile became a symbol of black superiority.13  It was not the 
violent act, two men boxing, which prompted restriction.  What troubled men like 
Representative Thetus Sims was the context of the act – a black man easily defeating a 
white man in a real, public physical competition.
Following Johnson’s defeat of Burns and Ketchel, Jim Jeffries was goaded out of
retirement to challenge Johnson “for the sole purpose of proving that a white man is 
better than a Negro.”14 Press build up for the fight was extraordinary, billed on both sides 
as a confrontation between black racial pride and white racial beliefs. The San Francisco 
Examiner reported that President Taft had arranged for telegraph reports and that his son 
was “betting all his money on the pride of the white trace.”15 Some black scholars have 
seen the Johnson-Jeffries fight as the most important event since Emancipation.16 The 
fight was held on July 4, and Johnson played with the symbolism by appearing with an 
American flag draped from his shorts.17 He triumphed after fifteen rounds of toying with 
the substantially outclassed Jeffries.
Most likely assuming that Jeffries would win, there had been few efforts to stop 
the fight itself, and if the Examiner can be trusted there was interest in the outcome all the 
way to the White House.  The Taft administration turned a deaf ear to efforts by 
13 The white-toothed smile, an identifying mark of the stereotyped “Negro,” was a physical location of 
tension for critics of Johnson.  Jack London’s article in the New York Times, December 28, 1908 about the 
fights, calls on Jeffries to “emerge from his alfalfa farm and remove that smile from Johnson’s face.”  
London assumed that Johnson was performing, fully aware and in control of the racial expectations he was 
challenging.  Returning to the smile, London wrote that Johnson “cuffed and smiled and cuffed, and in the 
clinches whirled his opponent around so as to be able to assume beatific and angelic facial expressions for 
the cinematograph machine.”
14 Lee Grieveson, Policing Cinema: Movies and Censorship in Early Twentieth Century America, 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 126.
15 Cited in Streible, 181.
16 Cited in Streible, 181, quoting Ashe.  In his three-volume survey of African-American athletes, Arthur 
Ashe states that because of the stakes and the outcome of the Reno fight, Johnson was “the most significant 
black athlete in history.”
17 Arthur R. Ashe, Jr, A Hard Road to Glory: A History of the African-American Athlete 1619-1918, Vol I, 
(New York, Amistad, 1993), 37.
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Presbyterian and Ministerial Union leaders to ban the fight, but religious pressure did get 
the fight moved from its original venue in San Francisco to Reno.18  Following the 
announcement of Johnson’s victory, racial violence erupted across the country: more than 
a dozen African-Americans were killed and hundred were wounded.19  Although there 
had been almost nothing done to stop the fight itself, and neither local nor federal 
governments suppressed the reporting of the outcome in the printed press, there were 
extensive measures to prevent the distribution of the images of Johnson knocking Jeffries 
down.
Local jurisdictions restricted showings of the Johnson-Jeffries film, but by the 
time Johnson fought Jim Flynn in 1912 national control measures were deemed 
necessary.  Bills were introduced in both House and Senate in May and June 1912 to 
preemptively restrict the distribution of the Johnson fight films, and special effort was 
made to distinguish the films from other “immoral” images in order to ensure that images 
of Johnson’s fights could be controlled by state governments directly.20  The successful 
bill, authored by Representative Sims, was devised “to prevent the shipping through the 
mails and in interstate commerce of moving picture films of prizefight films.”21  The 
Sims Act did not “go so far as to prevent newspaper accounts and reports of these 
contests”: only the films were at stake.22 The objection from white audiences and critics 
like Jack London was not to the fights occurring, but to the films of the fights being seen, 
especially by black audiences.  This anxiety only existed because of the outcome of the 
18 Ashe, 36.  The religious efforts to ban the fights are mentioned in Grieveson, 181.
19 New York Times July 5, 1910, p 4.  Ashe puts the fatalities at 13, while Grieveson claims five more.
20 Congressional Record (June 15, 1912), 8236.
21 Congressional Record (July 19, 1912), 9305.  
22 Congressional Record (July 19, 1912), 9304.
11
fights: if Johnson lost, and the expectation of his inferiority had been fulfilled, there 
would have been no efforts to suppress the contest.
Both the Sims Act and Mutual v. Ohio were proposed in order to control the 
images and the audience for these specific films.  Representative Seaborn Roddenberry of 
Georgia reaffirmed the intent of Tennessean Sims:
I call the attention of the House to the fact that the recent prize fight which was 
had in New Mexico presented, perhaps, the grossest instance of base fraud and 
bogus effort at a fair fight between a Caucasian brute and an African biped beast 
that has ever taken place.  It was repulsive.  This bill is designed to prevent the
display to morbid-minded adults and susceptible youth all over the country of 
representations of such disgusting exhibition…No man descended from old Saxon 
stock can look upon that kind of a contest without abhorrence and disgust.23
Even though the bills and court cases addressed the fight films so specifically, the legal 
framework for broad censorious control was established.  Once this national precedent 
had been set for the censoring of a specific film, genre, or subject to protect “susceptible 
youth,” the legal tools were in place to control any film at the local and state level.
Justice McKenna agreed that “there are some things which should not have 
pictorial representation in public places and to all audiences.”24  In order to control the 
fight films, and to restrict the application of First Amendment protections to them, both 
the Sims Act and Mutual v. Ohio considered films to be physical objects, and as such 
controllable like all other commercial goods.  
It cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business, 
pure and simple, originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles, not to 
be regarded, nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio Constitution, we think, as 
part of the press of the country, or as organs of public opinion.  They are mere 
representations of events, of ideas and sentiments published and known; vivid, 
23 Congressional Record (July 19, 1912), 9305.
24 Mutual v. Ohio, 7.
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useful, and entertaining, no doubt, but, as we have said, capable of evil, having 
power for it, the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition.25
The classification of films as commerce, which could be constitutionally 
regulated, and not art which carried constitutional protections, was a tactic to control the 
depiction of actions that could be read as threats to social norms.26  Johnson’s victory ran 
against racial assumptions, social standards, and government policy.  Film censorship 
was born legally specifically “to erase potentially positive and strong images of blacks 
from the public mind.”27 Much of that control was channeled through the image of the 
vulnerable child who might be corrupted by seeing such images.  A white child might 
question the supposed superiority of his race, and the black child might question his 
social standing or see violence as a tool for changing it.  
In their articles on the fight films, both Lee Grieveson and Dan Streible cite an 
editorial cartoon that appeared in the Jackson Clarion-Ledger depicting “a pair of boys, 
one black, one white, gazing at a poster for the [Johnson-Jeffries] fight film” outside a 
cinema.28  The caption for the picture reads “Educational?”  The cartoon at once brought 
together the idea of impressionable children, racial tension, and the unacceptable concept 
that children might learn that a black man had surpassed a white in a physical contest.  
The cartoon, published eight days after the fight, gives no indication who won the fight.
A July 9 cartoon from the New York Tribune that actually did suggest Johnson’s victory 
depicted two oversized hands labeled Public Opinion and Christian Endeavor hiding the 
25 Mutual v. Ohio, 8.  McKenna’s and Sims both defined films as commercial goods, but presupposed that 
such goods required governmental regulation, and that the free marketplace could not effectively control 
the content of films.  As Bernstein and Jowett observe, this definition makes film the only art form to have 
been created with legislative prior restraint built into its aesthetic.
26 Grieveson, 135.
27 James Snead, White Screens, Black Images: Hollywood from the dark Side (New York: Routledge, 
1994),147.
28 Streible, 185.  The cartoon is reprinted in Streible, 185 and Grieveson, 123.
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fighters from a young audience.  The caption reads “Save the children!”29  It is significant 
that both of these images were published after the fight and the race riots, and imply that 
the problem was not the fight as an event but the films.
The Hays Motion Picture Production Code
Once the legal structure for the control of films based on their “capacity for evil” 
was in place following Mutual v. Ohio, a body to administer that control was necessary.  
Matthew Bernstein writes that there have traditionally been two methods of censorship: 
external censorship boards and voluntary self-imposed codes.30  The problem with 
dividing censorship this way is that the self-regulatory boards would not exist without the 
threat of external censorship.  They have been created, as in the cases of the Motion 
Picture Producers and Distributors of America (1922), its later incarnation as the Motion 
Picture Association of America (1945), and the Entertainment Software Ratings Board
(1993), to prevent intervention by government censorship boards.  Thus they are 
implicitly founded on the values and needs of external authoritarian bodies.
While the Sims Act and Mutual v. Ohio had lasting effects on the structure of 
what an audience could see, they were not the first efforts to censor violence.  Rather, 
they were the first efforts to regulate film violence on a national level.  As noted above, 
Chicago and New York tried to restrict the public display of films, and local boards of 
censorship existed before 1910.  The first court case involving film censorship in the 
nation, Block v. the City of Chicago (1908), concerned two films singled out for their 
violence: The James Boys of Missouri and Night Riders.  The films had been denied a 
29 Reprinted in Grieveson, 128.
30 Bernstein, 1-2.
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license in Chicago for their violence, so Jake Block and other nickelodeon operators filed 
suit against the city’s censorship board.  Their argument was that the James Brothers’ 
stories were being presented in other visual media elsewhere in the city, and that the films 
were being singled out unfairly, and by being denied a license to show the films the 
nickelodeons were being unfairly regulated.31
The Illinois Supreme Court sided with Chicago, and Chief Justice Cartwright laid 
out two reasons why a government body needed the power to control cinema: films were 
available to “those classes whose age, education and situation in life specially entitle 
them to protection,” and that depictions of crime were “immoral and their exhibition 
would necessarily be attended with evil effects upon youthful spectators.”32  By 
establishing the rights of individual jurisdictions to set up independent censorship boards, 
combined with the process of censorship soon to be created by the Sims Act and Mutual 
v. Ohio, studios had an economic incentive to create their own self-regulatory body.  
Without knowing whether a particular city would license or reject a film, studios were 
being asked to take financial risks on every picture.  Furthermore, if different boards 
required different edits to a film, the studio was required to undertake the expensive 
process of producing different versions of its films for different venues.33 If there was a 
guarantee on the production side that the films would be approved for all markets, using a 
set of standards pre-approved and generally subscribed to, then the threat of local 
censorship boards could be eliminated.
Because New York was the center of film production, its market was the usual 
testing ground for censorship, and the New York Board of Review expanded into the 
31 Prince, 13.
32 Cited in Prince, 14.
33 Prince, 19.
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National Board of Censorship in March, 1909.  The Motion Picture Patents Company, 
which represented the major film producers, began submitting films through the National 
Board in June.  Although the board claimed to be reviewing three-quarters of all films 
distributed, regional censorship boards still existed in Pennsylvania, Maryland, New 
York, Ohio, Kansas, and Virginia.34
In 1922 the film studios formed their own organization, the Motion Picture 
Producers and Distributors of America, and appointed former Postmaster General Will 
Hays to run the organization and oversee the standards of the studios.  The Sims Act had 
been primarily concerned with the transportation of fight films through the mail, and the 
Post Office was the front line of obscenity regulation, so it is not an accident that a 
Postmaster was appointed to clean up film.  It took Hays eight years to refine the policies 
that would become the Production Code, co-authored with the St. Louis University 
theatre professor Father Daniel Lord and lay Catholic Martin Quigley, but in 1930 it 
became the self-imposed law of cinematic production, and all films for public distribution 
went through Hays’ office.35
The Hays Code, as it came to be called, says much about exactly what 
government bodies wanted to suppress, since the Code could not be less stringent than 
the local boards it was designed to replace.  The Code was the most successful measure 
for the control of violent content because it stated a clear policy for what audiences could 
and should see.  Scripts had to be submitted to the Hays office and approved before 
production could begin, and finished films were vetted for violations.  Violence against 
agents of the state, especially the police and lawyers, was explicitly forbidden.  It was the 
34 Prince, 18-19.
35 Jerold Simmons, “A damned nuisance: the production code and the profanity amendment of 1954,” 
Journal of Popular Film and Television, Vol. 25, No. 2 Summer 1997, 76.
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context of a violent act that mattered: machine guns could not be shown if gangsters were 
using them, but were permissible if federal agents shot criminals.  The Special 
Regulations on Crime in Motion Pictures, amended to the Code in 1938, specifically 
dictated that 
6. There must be no display, at any time, of machine guns, sub-machine guns or 
other weapons generally classified as illegal weapons in the hands of gangsters, or 
other criminals…
7. The flaunting of weapons by gangsters, or other criminals, will not be allowed.
…
10. There must be no scenes, at any time, showing law-enforcement officers 
dying at the hands of criminals.  This includes private detectives and guards for 
banks, motor trucks, etc.36
The New York board required scenes of police officers being attacked by criminals to be 
removed, but not the reverse.37 Criminals were not allowed to be shown actually breaking 
the law when it meant upsetting the power dynamic between the law and law-breakers.
Audiences should not see anything that violated the social hierarchies of power.  
If the logic behind restricting violent material is that audiences might become 
desensitized to it, or see it as natural or positive, the implication of the Hays Code is that 
violence is an appropriate, positive action when agents of the law inflict it.  Violence is 
declared socially permissible if police officers are the aggressors: they are allowed to 
wield sub-machine guns and kill criminals because the Production Code does not forbid 
them.  While the Code does not offer a wholesale endorsement of institutional 
aggression, it does imply that the state use of violence is proper.  Under no circumstances 
should criminals disrupt social hierarchies, but they are criminals because they disturb 
social order.  This is an echo of the logic behind banning the fight films: if Jeffries, the 
representative of white social dominance, had defeated Johnson, there would have been 
36 Cited in Prince, 302.
37 Prince, 25.
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no problem.  But Johnson’s victory rendered itself obscene because it challenged social 
power hierarchies.
In addition to dictating that films could not depict police officers as victims, the 
Production Code also put forward the idea of observational operant conditioning: not 
only were children seeing immoral acts, they were learning methods that they could 
potentially repeat.  The Code states:
1. Murder
a. The technique or murder must not be presented in a way that will 
inspire imitation.
b. Brutal killings are not to be presented in detail.
c. Revenge in modern times shall not be justified.
2. Methods of Crime should not be explicitly presented
a. Theft, robbery, safe-cracking, and dynamiting of trains, mines, 
buildings, etc., should not be detailed in method.
b. Arson must be subject to the same safeguards.38
This idea of audiences being subconsciously trained by media pushed restrictive 
measures into new territory: evidence of moral corruption in the individual could be 
provided using scientific rather than religious arguments.39  This shift from a moral to a 
scientific rationale for controlling violent images would define approaches to television 
violence.
38 Cited in Prince, 294.
39 Several scholars comment on the influence Protestant, and later Catholic attitudes had on the early 
creation of censorship.  As the power of religious bodies to directly influence government policy 
diminished, particularly regarding popular culture, we see a transfer of that authority to science in 
censorship tools.  See Prince, 20-23; Streible, 181; Jowett, 16-21; and Grieveson, 127-129.
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National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence
In the 1950s television began to threaten film’s audiences.40  As a result, cinema 
pushed in new directions with increasingly explicit sexual and violent content.  Driven by 
market forces, film began to reject and challenge the restrictions of the production code.
The legal structures that had enabled the Production Code were partially 
dismantled in 1952 with the Supreme Court Case Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 
Commissioner of Education of New York, et al. Burstyn was distributing the film The 
Miracle (1948), which included a scene in which a girl tending goats takes a passing man 
to be St. Joseph come to bear her to heaven.  The stranger plies her with wine, and 
“apparently ravishes her.”41  The film was attacked by religious leaders as sacrilegious, 
and the New York Board of Regents, acting as head of the educational system, reviewed 
the film and banned it.  Burstyn appealed the ruling to the Supreme Court.  
Between Mutual v. Ohio and the 1952 case, the Court had expanded protections
of media content and, through a series of independent rulings, found that “First 
Amendment guarantees against abridgement by the federal government [are] within the 
liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from 
invasion by state action.”42  The major argument of Mutual was gone, and Burstyn was 
the first case to re-challenge film censorship.  The latter case attacked the “film as 
business” premise of Mutual directly:
It is urged that motion pictures do not fall within the First Amendment’s aegis 
because their production, distribution, and exhibition is a large-scale business 
conducted for private profit.  We cannot agree.  That books, newspapers, and 
magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a 
form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment.  We fail 
40 Simmons, 78.
41 Burstyn v. Wilson, 8.
42 Burstyn v. Wilson, 4.
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to see why operation for profit should have any direct effect in the case of motion 
pictures.43
Although the Burstyn case does not deal with violence, and the protection of children 
never enters into the Court’s decision, it did dismantle the major tool of regulation.44
With a Supreme Court case upholding the Constitutional protection of film as a medium,
thereby eliminating the major legal rationale for censorship, and the pressure from 
television to present something different, movie studios had the freedom and incentive to 
produce increasingly violent films.  Without external support, and challenged from within 
the studios, the Production Code began to unravel, although it was still officially in place 
until 1968, by which time too many challenges had been mounted to its authority for it to 
survive.45
In 1969 the film industry rejected content-based restrictions on imagery in favor 
of a new strategy for control.  A new organization, the Motion Picture Association of 
America, proposed an age-based system of ratings to sort content.  It is significant for this 
discussion that the replacement for the Production Code was based on age: protecting 
children was the stated purpose of the rating system that is still in use today.  Such a 
system was not enough, because while it sorted content it could not control it.  An 
entirely new way of classifying media violence, as a social health issue rather than a 
moral concern, offered new ways to control content.
In the introductory remarks of the Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004
the political stance of this new search was described: “The urban riots of the 1960s again 
43 Burstyn v. Wilson, 4.
44 While modern audiences will read the ravishing of the goatherd as an act of violence, the Hays Code 
divides sexual behavior from violent behavior, and categorizes rape with seduction and not with Crimes 
Against the Law.  Burstyn does not deal with violence as the Hays Code defined it.
45 Prince, 196-204.
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raised concern about the link between television violence and violent behavior.”46
Classifying civil rights and anti-war demonstrations as responses to television violence 
seems a particularly disingenuous suggestion, and it seems that links between violent 
entertainment and the social use of force were suggested rather than established.
Against the backdrop of political assassinations, the violence surrounding the 
Civil Rights movement, and the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam, 
President Lyndon Johnson called for a “penetrating search…into our national life, our 
past as well as our present, our traditions as well as our institutions, our children, our 
customs and our laws” in order to explain a perceived escalation in social violence.47  He 
formed a National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, appropriately 
enough, the day President Kennedy died.48  The Commission, chaired by Dr. Milton 
Eisenhower, established a Task Force on the Media.
Although tasked with providing a report by June 1968, the Commission issued a 
series of staff reports that did not provide the conclusions that some officials were 
looking for.49 The chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Communications, John 
Pastore, had been interested in media violence since the early 1960s.  When he saw that 
the Eisenhower Commission would not provide the wholesale condemnation of media 
producers, Pastore took the radical step of asking the Surgeon General to prepare a report 
to “establish scientifically insofar as possible what harmful effects, if any,” violent 
entertainment had on children.50 As he framed it, “what is at stake is no less than our
46 Senate Report 108-253, 1.
47 Cited in Douglass Cater and Stephen Strickland, TV Violence and the Child: The Evolution and Fate of 
the Surgeon General’s Report, (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975), 12.
48 Cynthia Cooper, Violence on Television: Congressional Inquiry, Public Criticism and Industry Response, 
A Policy Analysis, (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc., 1996), 50.
49 Cater, 13-15.
50 Television and Growing Up: The Impact of Televised Violence, 1.
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most valuable and trusted resource – the minds and hearts of our young people.”51
President Nixon endorsed the approach Pastore was taking in a March 24, 1969 letter:
Dear Senator:
I want you to know that I join you in supporting the proposed one-year study [by 
the Surgeon General] of the possible relationship between scenes of sex and 
violence on television and antisocial behavior among young people…I share your 
deep concern and strongly applaud your vigorous criticism of what you regard as 
a misuse of this great medium.52
Pastore’s request to the Surgeon General was a complete redefinition in the way 
critics could approach violent media.  By suggesting that media violence could be a 
public health risk, films and television could be discussed and legislated in a new way 
that sidestepped the issues of free speech entirely. The idea of using the Surgeon 
General’s office this way may have been inspired by the success of anti-tobacco 
legislation that had been passed in 1967 after the Surgeon General issued the first studies 
about secondhand smoke, redefining smoking from a personal habit to a public health 
concern.
The Surgeon General’s office did investigate the issue, finally releasing their 
report in 1972.  The report had many of the problems with statistical analysis that I will 
explore in the second part of this study: questions were narrowly defined and 
presupposed its conclusions.53
It is sometimes asked if watching violent fair on television can cause a young 
person to act aggressively.  The answer is that, of course, under some 
circumstances it can.  We did not need massive research to know that at least an 
occasional unstable individual might get sufficiently worked up by some show to 
act in an impulsive way.54
51 Robert Baker and Sandra J. Ball, Mass Media and Violence, a staff report to the National Commission on 
the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Vol. 9. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), 
383.
52 Quoted in Cater, 20.
53 Television and Growing Up, 4.
54 ibid
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This is one of the first instances of a government agency allowing for the unique, 
“unstable” individual into the discourse of violent television.  Before this report, which 
was commissioned and concerned itself with medical evidence, children were corrupted 
by television – they did not come to television already damaged.
Although the 1972 study has been cited as a support of the morally corrosive 
effect of violence, the report does not fully support this position.  Rather, it questions 
available data and calls for an examination of what amounts to a scopic regime:
[H]ow much contribution to the violence of our society is made by extensive 
violent television viewing by our youth?  The evidence (or more accurately, the 
difficulty of finding evidence) suggests that the effect is small compared with 
many other possible causes, such as parental attitudes or knowledge of and 
experience with the real violence of our society.
…
In our judgment, the key question that we should be asked is thus a complicated 
one concerning alternatives.  The proper question is, “What kinds of changes, if 
any, in television content and practices could have a significant net effect in 
reducing the propensity to undesirable aggression among the audience, and what 
other effects, desirable and undesirable, would each such change have?”55
The significance of this Report is that it frames medical questions as governmental policy 
issues, which is exactly the tactic needed to regulate media now that regulatory boards 
were only describing, not dictating, content.
Joint Hearings on Video Game Ratings
The Surgeon General issued his report in 1972, the same year that the first video 
game emerged.  Tested in Andy Capp’s Tavern in Sunnyvale, California, Pong quickly 
proved that video arcade games were economically viable, could generate crowds of 
viewers in addition to players, and encouraged repeat playing in the pursuit of high scores 
55 Television and Growing Up, 4- 5.
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or technical mastery.56 By giving players the power to control characters, video games 
offered an entirely new problem for critics and defenders of media violence.  Not only 
were young, primarily male players watching violence, they were controlling it, and 
being rewarded within the world of the game and social environment of the arcade for 
that behavior.
This social behavior inherent in video games is an overlooked aspect of their 
function.  Social interaction has an enormous effect on the understanding and perception 
of violence, and alters the way players interact with the participatory aspects of games.
Video games…are often designed to be played one-on-one, which means that 
there are at least two people in the same room doing the same thing.  If you 
arrange a homemade tournament in, for example, hockey, which is a very popular 
kind of video game, as many people as desired can participate.  Today, video 
games are being converted to PC-format, but this social way of playing is the 
nature of video games.57
Video games are a fundamentally different form of entertainment than theatre, 
movies, and television because they require active interaction.  If media had been 
classified as commerce that was subject to trade regulation, or art protected by the First 
Amendment, the basic form of video games makes them difficult to categorize this way.  
They are repetitive goal-oriented amusements that are played, like other games, but they 
function more like an interactive story with plots and characters.  When playing a video 
game that uses violence as its primary interface between the player and story, as opposed 
to a sport or puzzle game, the audience for video games participates by determining, to a 
limited extent, what the game’s story and violent visual content will be.  At the same 
56 Steven L. Kent, The Ultimate History of Video Games, (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2001), 43-45.
57 Jan Christofferson, “The Monster Massacre or What is a Violent Electronic game?” in Children in the 
New Media Landscape: Games, Pornography, Perceptions, ed. Cecilia von Feilitzen and Ulla Carlsson, the 
UNESCO International Clearinghouse on Children and Violence on the Screen (Dordico: Goteborg 
University, 2000), 27.
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time, players have been traditionally restricted by the programmed, predetermined 
sequence to games’ stories: if you defeat this character or achieve this goal, your 
character will move on to another opponent or another goal, and the player cannot do 
anything except the task at hand.  For fighting games, this means that all a player can
ever do is fight.
In 1993 two revolutionary games were released that escalated the scope of 
electronic violence and brought Congressional attention to video games: Acclaim Games 
developed Mortal Kombat for arcade and game consoles, and id Software released Doom
for the home computer.58 Both games were designed for social play: Acclaim’s game is a 
two-player system and id Software’s was one of the first network-compatible computer 
games. Mortal Kombat was developed to compete with Capcom’s successful Street 
Fighter II, a proscenium-framed arcade game in which players controlled cartoon-
rendered martial artists.  
Street Fighter II reinvigorated the fighting genre of arcade games by refining 
existing elements: a range of different characters with different fighting styles that 
players could choose, and secret attacks that gave players who knew them arcade 
prestige.  The sole objective for players of fighting games was to defeat one’s computer 
or human opponent in combat.  Mortal Kombat used the same basic formula, but used 
digitally-rendered lifelike human characters instead of Capcom’s cartoons, and added 
blood and lethal techniques to a player’s range.59 Doom was a first-person perspective 
game in which the player manipulated the keyboard and mouse to control a small arsenal 
58 Kent, 458-466.
59 Acclaim also made a revolutionary step in their digitizing process, bringing in stunt performers and 
martial artists to render the characters’ movements instead of animating cartoon sprites.  See the testimony 
of Eugene F, Provenzo, Jr in “Rating Video Games,” 18.
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of weapons (fist, pistol, shotgun, grenades, and large handheld fantasy weapons of mass 
destruction).  Points were awarded within scenarios for the completion of ob jectives and 
the killing of demonic enemies.  
Both games offered violence on a scale never seen before.  Mortal Kombat added 
graphic “Fatality” techniques to kill opponents at the end of a match, and these “ranged 
from [the character] Kano wrenching his opponents’ hearts out of their chests to [the 
character] Scorpion pulling out their spines and skulls.”60 Doom mixed Satanic imagery 
with graphic but cartoony injuries, and unlike competing home PC games the first few 
levels of the game were distributed for free as Shareware.61  The real revolution of both 
games was the technology that made them both so detailed.  Doom players could move 
through a realistic three-dimensional world at high speed, and Mortal Kombat’s 
characters were realistic enough to read their lifelike facial expressions.
The secret techniques, including the Fatalities, are an important component of the 
social function of video games.  By generating enough victories to leave a high score 
saved on the game and publicly displayed, players could create a reputation.  Because the 
techniques were secret, other players would gather around arcade games to watch good 
players, simultaneously observing the player and the show on the video screen.  The 
Fatality techniques had to be acquired by practice or observation, and imply an 
interaction with the social dynamics of arcades and with forbidden visual material 
accessed through skill.  Doom included a “God Mode” that allowed players to cruise 
through levels without injury.  It was also one of the first networked games, allowing 
60 Kent, 464.
61 According to the game’s designer, John Romero, demand for the shareware version of Doom crashed the 
computer system of the University of Wisconsin twice.  Quoted in Kent, 459.
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multiple players to play the same scenario with each other on different computers, in 
different locations.
Acclaim released their game in September 1993, and id Software followed a 
month later.  By December a joint hearing in Congress had been scheduled to address the 
“problem” of video game violence and to call attention to the marketing of violent 
content to minors during the Christmas shopping season.62 A panel of experts on 
education and child psychology squared off against a disparate panel of economic 
adversaries representing software manufacturers Nintendo, Sega, the Software Publishers 
Association, the Video Software Dealers Association, and the Amusement and Music 
Operators Association.  Lieberman and Kohl had created a public forum to debate video 
game content that pitted the two largest game manufacturers against each other sixteen 
days before Christmas, creating an incentive for the manufacturers to attack each other’s 
games and push for regulation.
Again, the emphasis was placed on policing material available to youth, images 
were declared proper and improper, the economic aspect of a medium, and the threat of 
Congressional action was used to induce self-regulation.
Our Nation’s children should not be told that to be a winner, you need to be a 
killer, or that make-believe violence yields real-life success.  That subtle but 
menacing message pollutes our society.  If the video game industry cannot 
effectively police itself – and so far, despite today’s announcement [of the 
creation of a voluntary ratings board], it has not proven that it can – then parents 
throughout the country will insist that Congress take action because while parents 
can rely on the dictates of the marketplace, obviously our children cannot.63
Objections were raised to this argument by witnesses from game manufacturers Sega 
America and Nintendo and from the Software Publishers Association, who argued that 
62 “Rating Video Games,” 1.
63 “Rating Video Games,” 8.
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the average age of video game players was above in the mid-twenties; that games already 
carried some rating; and that because games were too expensive for children to afford, 
the parents purchasing the games already had the responsibility and power to police their 
children’s activities.64
The implication is that the children in question are male.  As Senator Lieberman 
explained, 
It has been my experience with my kids and with other kids that is true that the – I 
am curious as to whether any of you know whether this is true that boys tend to 
play these games much more than girls; young boys tend to play much more than 
girls.  Therefore, when I see the obvious sexual aggression against the woman in 
Night Trap which kids have access to, I worry that…we are running the risk of 
increasing the probability that these boys who are playing these games are going 
to be more sexually aggressive and abusive as a result of the experiences they 
have had with these games.65
Against the game manufacturers’ arguments was the Committee’s position, articulated by 
Senator Byron L. Dorgan:
I know there will be people who will call us the thought police trying to suggest 
what people can see or do.  That is not my intention.  However, we in the 
Congress have some basic responsibility in this country to protect children.  
Those of us who have children understand that they deserve protection.  Certain 
things are appropriate for them and certain things are not appropriate ...66
While Dorgan’s argument for protecting children and society is laudable, it does not 
match the content of the games that had prompted the discussion.  The scene in Night 
Trap that Lieberman was referring to, and that Dorgan wanted to protect children from, 
was “a scene in which a girl in a rather modest teddy is caught by the vampires and 
64 See the testimony of William White and Ilene Rosenthal, “Rating Video Games” 44 and 50.  Steven Kent 
does question the accuracy of the ages stated by representatives from both Nintendo and Sega America, 
since during the hearing it was in the companies’ best interest to portray video game players as older than 
they really were.  See Kent, 474-478.
65 “Rating Video Games,” 28.
66 “Rating Video Games,” 9.
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killed.  The scene was meant to show players that they had lost.”67  The players were not 
the sexually aggressive agents: it was their responsibility to protect the woman from 
sexual violence.  While this does imply a specific gender role for male players, that role 
is not obviously sexually aggressive.
The morning of the first round of hearings, the video game manufacturers who 
had been called to testify announced the creation of what would become the Electronic 
Software Ratings Board (ESRB), a self-regulatory body to monitor and rate video game 
content.  A minor, voluntary system had existed before, but ratings were different from 
company to company.  Senators Lieberman and Kohl used the economic pressure of the 
holiday shopping and the threat of government legislation to force the video game 
industry into imposing content regulations on itself. The hearings in 1999 would address 
the failure of these rating systems to change either game content or players’ access to that 
content.  
Judiciary and Surgeon General’s Report
Within a week of the April 20, 1999 shootings at Columbine High School, four 
members of Congress, including presidential hopefuls Joseph Lieberman and John 
McCain, called on the White House to convene a summit on media violence. Dylan 
Klebold and Eric Harris had made school video projects in which they referred to the 
video game Doom, and violent entertainment was quickly seized on as a prime inspiration 
for the assault.68  Within five months the Senate Judiciary and Commerce Committees 




fantasy violence posed to the nation’s physical safety and mental health.  The hearings 
represent the largest and most thorough public debate of the century about violent 
entertainment and the relationship between creative arts and violent behavior.  The final 
Judicial Committee report also brought together all of the arguments of the scopic 
regime: art as commerce, dictated self-regulation, medical classifications, and 
participatory training.
The Introduction to the Judiciary Report offers media violence as a key 
explanation for a whole range of social ills:
Americans have felt a growing and nagging uneasiness over the past several 
years. Yes, we have come to enjoy unparalleled material prosperity, personal 
freedom, and opportunity. And, yes, we live longer, healthier lives. Yet, for all 
these achievements, we also sense that our nation suffers from an insidious decay. 
Americans would hardly be surprised to learn that we lead the industrialized 
world in rates of murder, violent crime, juvenile crime, imprisonment, divorce, 
single-parent households, numbers of teen suicide, cocaine consumption, per 
capita consumption of all drugs, and pornography production. The horrifying 
spate of school shootings during the past two years has transformed that 
uneasiness into an almost desperate alarm. Behind the facade of our material 
comfort, we find a national tragedy: America's children are killing and harming 
each other. As Colorado Governor Bill Owens lamented in the wake of the 
Columbine High School massacre, a "virus" is loose within our culture, and that 
virus is attacking America's youth, our nation's most vulnerable and precious 
treasure. 
…
A growing body of research concludes that media violence constitutes one 
significant part of the answer.
…
Plainly, any solution to the juvenile violence problem that fails to address media 
violence is doomed to failure.69
The passage invokes a problem - the “insidious decay;” identifies the victims –
“America’s youth;” frames that problem in a medical context -“the ‘virus’;” enumerates 




The significance of the 1999 Reports is that they were prompted by the 
Columbine shootings, an act of violence that could be directly connected to violent 
media.  Klebold and Harris had made references to Doom in school projects, and had 
rewritten the game to create a playing field that resembled their high school.  There is, 
however, no evidence that the game inspired the assault, only that it was one of a series –
written class assignments, counseling sessions in response to threatening behavior, and 
online diaries expressing their interest in weapons and social frustration – indications that 
Klebold and Harris had strong antisocial attitudes.  Their interest in Doom seems not to 
be causal, but an outlet for activities and attitudes that were already destructive.
Although the 1999 Judicial and Commerce hearings represent a synthesis of all 
previous strategies of scopic regimentation, even with a direct connection to violent 
media the hearings produced no new innovations.  I propose that the challenge facing the 
scopic hegemony was that the only successful censorship effort, the Hays Production 
Code, had imposed a regulatory body between the producers and the consumers.  
Technological advances in the last decade of the twentieth century, notably the internet 
and digital filming technology, decentralized the production of media.  Anyone with a 
computer can now produce and distribute violent media, and there is no practical way to 
control the consumption of violent content when there is no single or organized 
production source.  This problem may represent the end of regulatory efforts, or it will 




A thorough assessment of the scientific studies that examined violent 
entertainment’s effect on behavior has already been accomplished by Jonathan Freedman.  
Freedman’s book, Media Violence and Its Effect on Aggression strongly critiques the 
methodology of those studies, My purpose is not to repeat Freeman’s work, but to 
examine how and why the evidence was collected, and how it has been presented to the 
general public.  
In spite of nearly a century of research into the effects of violent entertainment on 
American audiences, no one has ever definitively established a causal link between 
watching violence and being violent.70 The best any study has been able to show is 
summed up in the Stanford study of television in 1961:
For some children, under some conditions, some television is harmful.  For other
children under the same conditions, or for the same children under other
conditions, it may be beneficial.  For most children, under most conditions, most
television is probably neither particularly harmful nor particularly beneficial.71
This is not to suggest that a link does not exist; only that it has not been shown to be 
causal.  Furthermore, it has not been established whether it is television itself, or violent 
content, that causes antisocial behavior.72 As numerous scholars have observed, positive 
correspondence between violent media and violent behavior is probably due to a 
70 Jonathan Freedman, Media Violence and Its Effect on Aggression: Assessing the Scientific Evidence, 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002), 194-210.
71 Schramm, 6.
72 Gerard Jones, Killing Monsters: Why Children Need Fantasy, Super Heroes, and Make Believe Violence 
(New York: Basic Books, 2002), 23-24.  Jones citesThomas N. Robinson, Marta Wilde, Lisa Novracruz, K. 
Farish Haydel, and Ann Varady, “Effects of Reducing Children’s Television and Video Game Use on 
Aggressive Behavior,” The Journal of Pediatric and Adolescent Medicine, Vol. 155, Jan 2001, 21-22.
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predisposition in aggressive individuals towards aggressive displays.73
There is disagreement within the scientific community between the studies and 
their public presentation.  A positive correspondence between exposure and behavior is 
referred to as causal, even if the actual studies did not test for or  demonstrate that 
connection.  Psychologist Christopher J. Ferguson also proposes three reasons why a 
positive statistical correlation in studies does not demonstrate a causal connection.
• Humans are by nature a violent species and may demand violence in their 
entertainment.  Violent media, then, are not a necessary precursor to 
violent behavior.
• Unlike lung cancer, which is rare outside of individuals not exprosed to 
cigarette smoke or other inhaled carcinogens, violent behavior is common 
in the absence of violent media, whereas many who are exposed to violent 
media demonstrate no violent behavior.  Violent media, then, are not 
sufficient to cause violent behavior.
• The effect sizes of media violence research are small.  They account for 
only a small fraction of the variance in violent behavior.74
The most obvious flaw in the anti-violence arsenal is Ferguson’s second point:
millions of people see the exact same material and only a tiny fraction of that audience 
actually displays any aggressive behavior.  Crime rates among the juveniles, the 
population supposedly at risk, are falling.
73 Surgeon General, 90; Jonathan Kellerman, Savage Spawn: Reflections on Violent Children (New York: 
Ballantine, 1999), 71-79.
74 Christopher J. Ferguson, “Media Violence: Miscast Causality,” in American Psychologist, Vol 57, 
June/July 2002, 446.  The comparison of violent media to cigarette research, which recurs throughout 
media literature,.  stems from Senator Pastore’s 1968 campaign, which used the model of successful 
legislation of the tobacco industry following secondhand smoke studies that redefined smoking as a public 
health issue.
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From 1993 to 1998, the rates of murders committed by youth aged 12 to 17 fell by 
56 percent, and the teen murder victimization rate fell by nearly as much (48 
percent).  Both those rates are…barely higher than the late-‘70s rates for Boomer 
teens.  The teen murder-rate reductions in large urban states has been staggering: 
down 54 percent in California, down 55 percent in Texas, down 66 percent in 
Massachusetts, down 78 percent in New York.  In a dramatic reversal from the 
Gen-X youth era, when the murder arrest rate doubled while the rate for older 
adults fell, the Millennial murder rate is falling considerably faster than the rates 
for older generations.75
The most recent data from the Department of Justice, summarized in their report 
“Juvenile Arrests 2002” corroborates these statements.  The report also states that arrests 
for Suspicion increased a staggering 49% between 2001 and 2002, after declines of 43% 
from 1993-2002, suggesting that the perception of juveniles as dangerous has recently 
increased while their actual criminal activity has decreased.76
The general rise in twentieth crime statistics may also be misleading, since 
between 1917 and 1975 (when many crime statistics began to be tracked) there were four 
major international wars in which the United States participated, which not only drew a 
substantial percentage of the total male population but also may have recruited from the 
pool of aggressive personalities.
In spite of the lack of a causal connection between violent stimuli to aggressive 
behavior, there has been an increased effort to use scientific studies to craft public 
opinion and to support legislation restricting that content.  There is a disconnection
between the actual behavior of citizens and the perception of what that behavior should 
75 Neil Howe and William Strauss, Millennials Rising: The Next Great Generation (New York: Vintage 
Books, 2000), 207.  Dave Grossman argues in Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill against the use of murder 
rate statistics, since medical technology allows for a higher survival rate (Grossman, 14-15), but he also 
argues that violent offenders are increasingly deadly (Grossman, 75-77). 
76 Howard N. Snyder, “Juvenile Arrests 2002,” Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention: 
Juvenile Justice Bulletin, September 2004.  The only other arrest rates to increase were prostitution (up 
27% between 1993-2002), murder (up 2% between 2001-2002 in spite of a 64% decrease between 1993-
2002), and sex offenses besides forcible rape and prostitution (down 9% overall between 1993-2002, but up 
1% between 2001-2002).  While arrest rates are not as useful as conviction rates in tracking actual criminal 
behavior, they do track the perception of criminal behavior.
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be.  Critics of violent entertainment continue to assert that “the debate is over.”77 The 
first step in this process has been to inflate the importance and substance of the extant 
studies.  The “Joint Statement on the Impact of Entertainment Violence on Children,” 
endorsed by representatives from the American Academy of Pediatrics, American 
Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, American Psychological Association, 
American Medical Association, American Academy of Family Physicians, and American 
Psychiatric Association, stated:
At this time, well over 1000 studies – including reports from the Surgeon 
General’s office, the National Institute of Mental Health, and numerous studies 
conducted by leading figures within our medical and public health organizations –
our own members – point overwhelmingly to a causal connection between media 
violence and aggressive behavior in some children.78
A year after signing that declaration, a policy statement by the American Association of 
Pediatrics announced that “[m]ore than 3500 research studies have examined the 
association between media violence and violent behavior; all but 18 have shown a 
positive relationship.”79 They repeated this new number in testimony before Congress.80
The source of their number was not a longitudinal study by an independent or 
governmental medical agency; according to their footnotes, it was Dave Grossman’s 
book Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill. A former Army officer and the author of two 
books, On Killing and Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill, Grossman has been a heavily cited 
opponent of violent entertainment.
77 Dave Grossman and Gloria DeGaetano, Stop Teaching Our Kids to Kill: A Call to Action Against TV, 
Movie & Video Game Violence (New York: Crown Publishers, 1999), 23, and Psychiatric Effects of Media 
Violence, American Psychiatric Association.
78 Joint Statement on the Impact of Entertainment Violence on Children, July 26, 2000.
79 AAP Committee on Public Education Policy Statement, November 2001, 2.
80 Testimony of the American Academy of Pediatrics on Media Violence, September 13, 2000.
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All three of the numbers, the Joint Statement’s 1000, AAP’s 3500, and 
Grossman’s 2500, are misleading.  In their 1987 survey of available studies, Paik and 
Comstock only uncovered 217 studies.81  A meta-analysis to assess the actual results of 
research covered only twenty-three studies, and the 1972 Surgeon General’s Report 
found only 50 studies to work with.82 The massive bibliography of 2886 citations 
compiled by John P. Murray in 1980 includes summaries of findings, books that cite 
studies, articles that cite studies, but the same relatively small pool of actual studies.83
There have been more studies of the effects of silicone breast implants than there have 
been of the effects of violent entertainment on audiences.84  If these larger numbers have 
been calculated using bibliographic lists like Murray’s, they do not reflect the number of 
actual scientific studies, as they claim to do.  There is no obvious source for the claim 
that thousands of studies have been conducted.
The issue is not one of the studies’ validity, but their use in influencing or 
supporting social policy.  The volume of studies has been used to lend scientific validity 
to social agendas since the dissolution of the Hays Production Code in 1968, which was 
founded on arguments of morality.  Science has replaced morality as the justification for 
restricting violent images.  The inflated numbers of studies do not appear in publications 
circulated within the comparatively private world of research scientists.  Only when a 
document will enter the public sphere, like the Joint Statement or Congressional 
testimony, do these larger numbers appear.  These numbers have been inflated to 
81 Hae-Jung Paik and George Comstock, Television and Children: A Review of Recent Research, (Syracuse 
University: ERIC Clearinghouse on Information Resources, 1987).   Also Government Document ED 
1.310/2:292466.
82 Television and Growing Up, 6.
83 John P. Murray, Television & Youth: 25 Years of Research & Controversy (Boys Town: Boys Town 
Press, 1980).  Also Government Document Ed-201-302.
84 Freedman, 17.
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convince the public of the dangers of media violence, a conclusion which is either 
contradicted or not warranted by the very studies that have been cited.85  The researchers 
who prepared the AAP’s statement did not go to politically neutral, scientific sources to 
support their position, they went to sources and studies that, like Bandura and Grossman, 
are flawed or biased models.
Another basic problem is the abuse of research: the application of conclusions 
drawn from one medium to another.  The Eisenhower Commission reviewed two dozen 
available empirical studies on media violence, but “the cited studies had involved films as 
research tools…none apparently had employed actual television sequences or 
programs.”86
Stage combat teachers J.D. Martinez and James D. Strider use arguments about 
film and television to explain how violence functions in live theatre, assuming that 
violence functions the same way in both art forms.  Martinez, former president of the 
Society of American Fight Directors and the author of several books on stage combat, 
challenges the distinction between “essential” and “gratuitous” violence.  Although his 
subject is theatrical violence, he refers to statements and studies by the American 
Psychological Association, American Medical Association, American Academy of 
Pediatrics, and the American Academy of Child Psychology - not one of which makes 
any statement about theatre or the aesthetics of live performance.87  Strider goes even 
further in his confusion of evidence.
85 Freedman, 201.
86 Cater, 30.
87 Martinez in Theatre Symposium 7, 78.  The author goes so far as to paraphrase the 1999 Judicial Report, 
using the phrase “the debate is over,” which appears in Grossman, 23 and the 1993 APA Position Paper.  
Referring to the same medical organizations, Jonathan Freedman observes that “it is almost certain that not 
one of these organizations conducted a thorough review of the research,” Media Violence and Its Effect on 
Aggression, 9.
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In the Fall 1993 issue of The Fight Master, one of the Society of American Fight 
Directors’ fight masters, Richard Raether, asserts that “Realistic stage violence 
does not inspire real-life imitation because [real violence] [sic] is accompanied by 
real consequences.”  Raether’s belief is a common but serious misapprehension.  
Cognitive psychologist Richard Jackson Harris tells us of a thirteen year old boy 
who, in 1984, killed himself with a handgun playing Russian roulette with a 
friend.  The boys had recently seen the Oscar-winning movie The Deer Hunter
and were re-enacting the scenes in which American POWs were forced by 
Vietnamese captors to play the fatal game.88
In the embedded quote, Raether singles out the effect of violence in live theatre, and 
Strider immediately applies evidence from a different art form to chastise Raether, 
assuming that audiences for film and theatre are socially identical and respond in 
identical ways.  This misappropriation of data from one art form and applying it to 
another speaks to the eagerness of both artists and critics to group media together and 
subject them to the same definitions.  Martinez’s call for “socially responsible” stage 
fight direction implies that the audiences for theatre are the same audiences 
Congressional hearings consider, that theatre has an obligation to be morally instructive 
in its presentation of violence, and that theatre artists should voluntarily apply
proscriptive definitions of social conduct and visual spectacle.89
Another flaw inherent to all scientific studies of the effect of violent media on 
children is that the thesis cannot ethically be proven.  If a researcher intends to show that 
watching violent television shows will damage children or generate antisocial behavior, 
there is a built-in limit to the level of violence that they can be shown before causing that 
damage.  As a result, all of the studies have built models that imperfectly approximate 
audience behavior. Children in the oft-cited Bandura study watched a film of an adult 
88 Strider, 3.
89 Martinez, 83-84 and Strider, 18-19.
38
punching an inflatable clown.90  They did not watch the movies that had prompted the 
investigation in the first place: Straw Dogs, Bonnie and Clyde, or The Killers.
Aggressive behavior in some cases was defined by the child subject’s willingness to say 
“yes” when asked if an adult should pop a balloon.91
This ethical dilemma in experimentation is not a minor problem of scientific 
method; it is a logical flaw that complicates the connection between policy and science.  
Government committees have argued that children might be damaged by seeing specific 
violent images: fistfights in television’s The Untouchables , the beheadings of Mortal 
Kombat, or a student shooting up his school in The Basketball Diaries.92  Experiments 
commissioned to support this claim have not recreated the problem, but have substituted
violent actions - the abstract image of an adult attacking an inflatable toy clown - for 
dramatic violence embedded within a story with character relationships and 
dramaturgical causes and effect.
One of the other fundamental problems of studies lies in this relationship between 
violence and context.  In Liebert and Baron, one hundred and thirty-six children between 
the ages of five and nine were shown six and a half minutes of television.93  The control 
group saw two and half minutes of commercials, intercut with “competitions in races, 
90 The Bobo the Clown Experiment is cited in the 1993 APA Position Paper, the 2001 AAP Policy 
Statement, Freedman, Jones, Cater, Anderson/Dell.  Flaws of the Bandura study are mentioned in Murray, 
30; Jones, 38; and Joseph Klapper, “The Impact of Viewing ‘Aggression’: Studies and Problem of 
Extrapolation,” in Violence and the Mass Media, Otto N. Larsen, ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 
135.  Of particular note is Klapper’s observation that Bobo the Clown, with its heavy rounded base, was a 
toy designed to be punched repeatedly.
91 Cited by Klapper, 133.
92 The Basketball Diaries became the subject of discussion after the Columbine shootings because the film 
includes a dream sequence of a student assaulting his school.
93 Robert M. Liebert and Robert Baron. “Short Term Effects of Televised Aggression on Children’s 
Behavior,” presented at symposium “The early Window: The Role of Television in Childhood,” American 
Psychological Association (Washington, D.C., September 1971).  Also Government Document ED-054-
626.
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hurdles, and high jumps.”94  The other group was shown the same commercials, this time 
intercut with three and a half minutes of violent footage from The Untouchables, 
featuring “a chase, two fist fights, two shootings, and a knifing.”95  Afterwards 
[A]ll children were given a series of 20 opportunities to either help or hurt a peer 
who was ostensibly playing in another room…Despite the brevity of the 
aggressive sequences, the absence of a strong prior instigation to aggression, and 
the clear availability of an alternative helping response, children who were 
exposed to The Untouchables sequence made hurting responses of significantly 
longer duration than those exposed to the highly active but nonaggressive control 
program. 96
The study does not test the children’s response to an episode of The 
Untouchables, but rather their response to abstract, non-contextual violent images in an 
unfamiliar environment.  Had the children seen the entire television episode, in which the 
fist fights, shootings, and knifings were presumably explained, they may have had 
different reactions.  Had the actions occurred in an identifiable context, the violence may 
have aligned with socially acceptable uses of force.  The tests that link violent content to 
aggressive behavior do so with an assumption that aggression is always a negative, 
inappropriate response.  
Ultimately the experiments discussed here serve as another form of the scopic 
regime: scientists with clip boards dictate the images that children can see, provide them 
with the opportunity to respond in a predicted way, and then use this abnormal behavior 
within an abnormal situation to define normal behavior.  As Gerard Jones observes, 
A child choosing to watch Dragon Ball Z because he knows it will make him 
happy is having a fundamentally different experience from a child who doesn’t 
even like Dragon Ball Z being told, “You have to watch this now” – and his 
reaction will be just as different.  This may explain the famous Coates-Pusser-





after watching a video than before – even though the video was Mister Rogers’ 
Neighborhood.  This led some analysts to conclude that television viewing itself, 
regardless of content, inspires violent behavior.  It more likely means that being 
made by a strange adult to watch television makes a child anxious or angry.97
Although some critics like Martinez argue that the context  of violence is 
irrelevant, it has been a basic principle of censorship codes. Hays’ Production Code 
dictated that crimes against the law could not be presented “in such a way as to throw 
sympathy with the crime as against the law,” that unpleasant subjects “should always be 
subject to the dictates of good taste and a regard for the sensibilities of the audience,” and 
that hangings, brutality, brandings, and surgeries could be depicted “within the careful 
limits of good taste.”98  The Johnson-Jeffries fight could have been distributed – if 
Jeffries had won.99 Graphic video game violence was permissible unless realistic, 
digitized human images were depicted.100
Particularly in the case of the Production Code, context was a way to reinforce 
politically approved standards of social behavior, and to restrict political critique.  The 
very first area that the Production Code treats is “Crimes Against the Law,” and the 
Code, put in place because courts were upholding states’ censorship rights, explicitly 
dictates that “[t]he courts of the land should not be presented as unjust.”101  Some topics 
97 Jones, 35.  The study cited is in Child Development 47 (1976).  Dragon Ball Z follows six martial artists 
as they protect the Earth from two evil warlords.  The story has been played out through video games, 
comic books, and a very popular animated television show.  “The Dragon Ball brand has generated over 
USD 3 billion in worldwide licensed merchandise - a number that few animated series can compete with. It 
is among the top-rated series on Cartoon Network and was the number-one rated show among all U.S. 
cable TV programs for 'tweens 9-14, boys 9-14 and men 12-24 during 2002 season's launch line-up. For the 
second consecutive year, “Dragon Ball” was the most searched-for term on the Internet according to 
Lycos.” Source: http://www.megagames.com/news/html/console/dragonballzsequelannounced.shtml, 
accessed October 29, 2004.
98 Quoted in Prince, 294-295.
99 Streible, 182.
100 Kent, 470.  The Judiciary Report concludes with recommendations to parents to help children 
understand violent material  A series of suggested questions ask children and parents to specifically analyze 
the context of violence.
101 Cited in Prince, 299.
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could not be seen at all: “[b]ecause of its evil consequences, the drug traffic should not be 
presented in any form.  The existence of the trade should not be brought to the attention 
of audiences.”102 For Hays, there was no possible dramaturgical circumstance in which 
drugs could be shown, not even the punishment of offenders or the possible tragic effects 
of narcotics.
Cater and Strickland make an unusual comment about a possible bias of these 
studies: “The decade 1958 to 1968 – beginning with the United States’ response to 
Sputnik and ending when the cost of the Vietnam War began to block increases in the 
federal government’s domestic budget - was one of steady growth for biomedical and 
social science funds.”103  Although the authors move on quickly, there is an interesting 
suggestion that government funding for social science research was beginning to level off 
or diminish just as Senator Pastore was looking for new data to be generated.  In an 
environment of shrinking financial resources, researchers may have been inclined to 
propose models that would supply exactly what the Committees were looking for, 
“whether and to what extent television helped nurture the seeds of violence in American 
society.”104
To hear Sen. Joseph Lieberman describe Mortal Kombat  it was easy to forget that 
video games were originally designed to be played in social setting with peers: arcades, 
and later homes.  He neglected to mention, and Congressional hearings tended to ignore, 
that the game could be and was played without any of the spine-ripping, decapitations, or 
heart extractions.  The bulk of scientific evidence, Congressional investigation, and moral 
102 ibid
103 Cater, 26.
104 Cater, 16, italics mine.  I do not mean to suggest that the research done was definitely flawed, only that 
the comment about Government funding offers the possibility of bias.  If true, it is interesting that the 
funding of an actual war indirectly supported the public belief that television was responsible for real-world 
violence.
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proclamation never take into account the fact that these games - and violent movies, 
plays, and television shows – can be enjoyed by audiences that have some agency over 
how the material affects them.  Why they are fun is a cultural question, not a medical one, 
and the evidence shows that the overwhelming majority of video game, theatre, 




On November 9, 2004, the United States military launched Operation Phantom 
Fury to take the city of Fallujah, Iraq.  The Washington Post covered the attack, with a 
photograph above the fold depicting Iraqi insurgents shooting at American soldiers.  
Below the fold the Post ran a story on the release of the video game Halo 2, with a 
photograph of the computer-animated Marine character that players control.105
The game grossed $125 million in its first day, earning more money in a single 
day period than any film has.  The game was written and directed by Joe Staten, who 
designed a system of religious beliefs for the game’s alien villains.106  The juxtaposition 
of the game’s release, important enough to be on the front page of a national newspaper, 
and the real invasion by Marines of a country largely defined by its faith speaks to the 
intersection between violent media and the real activities it serves as a metaphor for.
The presupposition of a scopic regime is that authoritarian bodies need to control 
the framing of violence and the perception of aggression, but why do they need to?  A 
pamphlet issued by the National Board of Review of Motion Pictures in 1921 stated that
There is no popular demand for state censorship.  The average American family 
attend [sic] the show once a week and enjoy it.  Censorship agitation is artificially 
stirred up by well-meaning but insufficiently informed reformers, who wish to 
impose their own standards of taste upon everyone else.  It is encouraged by 
certain political elements who covet the patronage and the power over channels of 
public information which it would give them.107
105 Jackie Spinner and Karl Vick, “U.S. and Iraqi Troops Push into Fallujah,” and Jose Antonio Vargas, 
“Halo 2 Ready to Run Rings Around Video Game Industry,” in The Washington Post, November 9, 2004, 
A-1.
106 Geoff Keighley, “Hooray for ‘Halo’-wood,” in Entertainment Weekly, reprint of published article 
accessed online November 23, 2004.  http://www.ew.com/.
107 Quoted in Lamar Beman, Selected Articles on Censorship of the Theatre and Moving Pictures (New 
York: W.W. Wilson Company, 1931), 211.
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By examining the ways in which governmental mechanisms of control have intersected
with the media violence debates, I hope to explore the fundamental question of 
Feldman’s scopic regime: who benefits from such a regime, and why is it imposed?  
For this chapter the scope must expand to take in real violence.  All of the 
examples so far, with the exception of the Johnson-Jeffries fight, have been of fictional 
aggression or violence that refers to and imitates  real-world actions.  These actions are 
either culturally permissible or forbidden depending on whether they simultaneously 
benefit levels in the hierarchy of the individual, a group, and the nation-state.108  A 
specific criminal act may benefit the individual, but it destabilizes the social group, and 
must be suppressed by the nation-state through laws and police.  An action that benefits 
the group at the expense of the individual, such as lynching as a form of racial repression, 
is permissible because the (white) group is more powerful than the (black) individual.  As 
the Johnson fights suggest, the renegotiation of racial hierarchy in the early twentieth 
century was seen by white audiences as a threat to both population groups and the nation.  
International military action, which may benefit the goals of the state at the expense of 
the goals of the individual or of groups, is always permissible.  
Violence and aggression are tools for state–level organizations, if directed 
through the proper channels. American University Professor of Justice Robert Johnson 
defines the purposes and mechanisms of what he calls “institutional violence”:
Violence is a product of institutional arrangements and is in some sense useful to 
these institutions…In its most blatant form, institutional violence involves the 
intentional use of overt violence by agents of institutions in pursuit of institutional 
goals…So far as is practical and necessary, the links among situations, 
dispositions and perceptions – especially exonerating perceptions – are 
108 I am using Alain Joxe’s model of social hierarchy and control practice, Violence and its Causes, 13. I 
have eliminated the level of institution as roughly analogous to group in my use of the model.
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prearranged by the institution and rehearsed by its personnel to promote 
predictable and guilt-free uses of violence.109
Guilt-free uses of violence can occur if the enemy of the state coincides with the enemy 
of the individual or group, and thus governments have created methods of regulating
violent content which restrict the quality of victims an audience can see.  In the case of 
the Production Code, enemies of the state/group (criminals) could be killed on-screen, but 
allies of the group/state (police officers) could not.
The state-level organizations that are defined by the use of violence are the police
and military.  While concern about the targets of violence centered on officers of the law 
in early cinema and television, the focus has shifted to the relationship between violent 
entertainment and the military.  A brief passage in Evan Wright’s book Generation Kill, 
“many [soldiers are] on more intimate terms with the culture of video games, reality TV 
shows and Internet porn than they with their own families,” found its way into reviews of 
the book by the Financial Times, USA Today, The New Statesman, Arena Magazine, and 
Publishers Weekly, even though it is almost the only reference to violent media in a book 
about actual soldiers on modern combat.  Reviewers focused on that quote because of the 
associations between violent media and real world military training.
One of the central figures of the more recent media violence debates has been 
Dave Grossman.  A former Army officer, Grossman holds a Masters of Education in 
Counseling Psychology and serves on the faculty of several universities.110  Straddling 
the military, academics, and medicine Grossman repeatedly uses his military title to 
identify himself, implying that his opinion bears more weight because of his association 
109 Robert Johnson, “Institutions and the Promotion of Violence,” in Violent Transactions: The Limits of 
Personality, Anne Campbell and John J. Gibbs, ed. (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 181.
110 Grossman’s biography appears on his Institute of Killology webpage: 
http://www.killology.com/personal_bio.htm, accessed October 10, 2004.
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to the armed forces.  Although he only taught at the service academy for two years as an 
assistant professor, and taught at Arkansas State University for twice that time, Grossman 
refers to himself as “a West Point psychology professor,” privileging his associations 
with the military over his position and training as a psychologist or academic.111
Grossman has been a source of expert testimony in media violence debates, and 
the use of his military title in these forums manipulates his attachment to the military to 
reinforce his position.  By choosing to focus on Grossman’s military credentials,  
between the military’s possible interest in controlling the public’s exposure to and 
interaction with violent images.  I do not mean to suggest that Grossman’s opinion is 
authoritative, but he has presented himself and been perceived as a representative of the 
military.112
A popular topic in popular media and scientific research was the suggested link 
between the Columbine shootings, the video game Doom, and military training.113  One 
of the innovations of Doom was that id Software released the source code for the game 
into the public domain, allowing players to modify the game and to create their own 
scenarios.
111 ibid
112 Joshua Goldstein’s exhaustive study War and Gender uses Grossman as his sole source for the section 
about video games, gender, and violence. 
113 Riddell; Grossman, 77; Anderson and Dill, 2-2; Pooley, 32.  One of the curious facts about the 
Anderson/Dell study is that they use the quote “playing out their game in God mode,” and cite Pooley’s 
May 10, 1999 Time article as the source.  Pooley attributes the quote to an unnamed researcher at the 
Simon Wiesenthal Center.  This is an instance of a scientific journal using media reporting of casual 
political internet research as an argument to support a scientific model.  The Anderson/Dell study observes 
that “research to date on video game effects is sparse and weak in a number of ways.  Indeed, one 
reviewer…has espoused the belief that ‘video game playing may be a useful means of coping with pent-up 
and aggressive energies’.”  Their position is that research that concludes the opposite of their assumption is 
automatically weak research.
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Klebold and Harris apparently did modify the game, creating a version with two 
shooters, unlimited ammunition, and a ground plan of Columbine High School.114  On the 
basis of this fact, Dave Grossman asserts that Doom “is still a good enough combat 
simulator that the Marine Corps uses a modified version of it (called Marine Doom) to 
teach recruits how to kill.”115  The idea that video games were actually teaching children 
the methods of execution has been a major plank in Grossman’s platform, and has been 
echoed in his testimony for the 1993 Video Game debates and the 1999 Judicial 
Report.116
Grossman is misstating the facts.  The first problem with his argument is that 
while the Marine Corps did use Doom to train recruits, it had to modify the game to make 
it useful.117  Thus the game as released to the public was an insufficient combat 
simulator.  More importantly, the Marine Corps version of the game was adapted to teach 
teamwork skills, not killing.  While it is true that the ultimate goal of the game is to kill 
the enemy, the actual skills that Marine Doom teaches are those of teamwork and 
battlefield decision-making.  Grossman does concede that the Marine Corps used Doom 
“as a tactical training device, as opposed to teaching motor skills,” but this caveat come 
twelve pages into his argument that video games like Doom actually teach the motor 
skills required to accurately and lethally operate firearms.118  Successful play of Marine 
Doom does not require the accurate or lethal operation of a firearm.   Lieutenant Scott 
Barnett, who helped adapt the software, explained that “Marine Doom…is not just a 
114 Anderson and Dell, 2.
115 Grossman, 77.
116 Judicial, 6.
117 Rob Riddell, “Doom Goes to War,” in Wired Magazine, April 1997, online archives accessed October 
31, 2004.  http://www.wired.com/wired/archives/5.04/ff_doom_pr.html.
118 Grossman, 77.
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twitch game.  The way to get through a Marine Doom scenario and survive is through 
teamwork,” repetitive decision making and not repetitive firing.119
The scenarios of Marine Doom are designed to force marines to make decisions in 
a combat situation, not to kill.  The pedagogic goals of Doom are the same as those 
fostered by another computer-based teaching tool, the Combat Decision Range (CDR), 
which projects computerized film clips of combat situations and requires participants to 
make decisions.  The scenarios for both the CDR and Doom are outlined by Gen. Charles 
C. Krulak in his article “Cultivating Intuitive Decisionmaking,” which is a required 
article in the Corps’ Tactical Decision Making course:
The CDR puts the squad leader square in the middle of the three block war and 
requires him to make decisions across the spectrum of conflict, from humanitarian 
relief to mid-intensity firefight, with the media watching. During a single 30 to 45 
minute CDR training scenario, a Marine squad leader must make 15 to 30 urgent, 
life or death decisions while land navigating and communicating both up and
down the chain of command.120
Citing Grossman, the 1999 Judicial Report and the medical associations’ Position 
Statements have mischaracterized the relationship of video games to actual military 
training.  The key programming component of Doom that set it apart from other potential 
training aids was its network capability, multiple players within the same virtual word, 
and its ability to recreate combat scenarios in order to teach leadership skills. By and 
large the military’s games are designed to teach teamwork in the digital public sphere, 
and not clinical methods of execution.




The dangerous child never grows up.  The dangerous generation is always on the 
horizon, ever youthful.  Adults, steeped in violent media for a century, should be 
regulated far more than children because conceivably they are more desensitized and far 
more prone to violent behavior. Except for institutional bias towards the “childish” 
populations - blacks and immigrants - through the 1920s, every censorship code has 
generally protected the rights of adults to see violent material, and restricted that material 
in the name of sheltering children.121
I do not mean to suggest in this paper that media have no effect on children, or 
that there are no ill effects of violent images.  But when we see a David Koresh, a Ted 
Kaczynski, or a Timothy McVeigh we do not search for the answers in movies, 
television, or video games.  Those adults like John Hinckley who actually seem to be 
inspired by violent films are described as aberrations.122  Part of the problem is our 
inability to perceive children as anything but blank slates.  Jonathan Kellerman argues 
that some children are simply, chemically, psychologically predisposed to violence.  Jon 
Rappaport wrote an online article suggesting that Luvox, the anti-depressant that Eric 
Harris was taking and which kept him out of the Marines, has a four percent chance of 
side effects ranging from mania to psychosis, and may have been the reason for his 
violent behavior.123  Neither of these two options, the naturally or medically dangerous 
child, has received the national attention of Doom.  The lack of evidence to support the 
121 One noted exception to this is Sen. Lieberman’s suggestion that some video game content was 
inappropriate even for adults.  Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Juvenile Justice, p.59.
122 Valerie P. Hans and Dan Slater, “John Hinckley, Jr. and the Insanity Defense: The Public’s Verdict,” in 
The Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer, 1983), 202.
123 Jon Rappaport, “School Violence: The Psychiatric Drugs Connection,” National Foundation for Gifted 
and Creative Children online article, accessed February 5, 2001.  http://www.nfgcc.org/schoolviolence.htm.
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connection between violent media and violent behavior, the small percentage of the 
population who actually act aggressively, and the overwhelming number of people who 
watch violent acts without any measurable side effect all suggest that there is no problem 
to be solved.  Perhaps when we discuss art, “violent” really can be a morally neutral 
adjective.
Perhaps the most perfect example of the scopic regime has been the visual 
coverage of the second Gulf War in Iraq.  Although they depict events that actually 
occurred, and not the fantastic possibilities of video games and film special effects, 
images of burned American soldiers and tortured Iraqi prisoners have been suppressed.  
Part of the reason behind their suppression is that they metaphorically present an 
aggressive American identity that does not correspond to the popularly imagined cultural 
identity.  “American’s” do not act that way, even in a forum in which force is wholly 
sanctioned.  Senator John Warner stated in a Senate hearing on the prisoner abuse scandal 
at Abu-Ghraib that 
the replaying of these images day after day throughout the Middle East and 
indeed the world has the potential to undermine the substantial gains -- emphasize 
the substantial gains -- toward the goal of peace and freedom in various operation 
areas of the world, most particularly Iraq, and the substantial sacrifice by our 
forces, those of our allies, in the war on terror.124
In the hearing, witnesses did not refer to the abuses; rather they repeatedly referred to the 
photographs of abuse.  General George Myers discussed “the story of the photographs,”
not the story of the abuse; Secre tary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld explained that “[t]he 
photographic depictions of the U.S. military personnel that the public has seen have 
124 Comments of Senator John Warner before the Senate and House Armed Services Committee, May 7, 
2004.
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offended and outraged everyone in the Department of Defense.”125   The entire hearing of 
May 7, 2004 revolved around whether and when military commanders knew about 
photographs, not the activities that they depicted. 
During the 1993 video game debates, expert witness Marilyn Droz attacked the 
video game manufacturers for their perceived irresponsibility:
It certainly isn’t their role to teach [children] to kill, maim and destroy – to be 
insensitive to the deadly consequences of violence.  If the Pentagon were to have 
developed this such as Mortal Kombat and then tried to place it in the homes of 
children, I don’t have to tell you what the American people would say.126
As it turned out, the Pentagon did oversee its own game.  Released by the U.S. Army a 
year after September 11, America’s Army takes its players through military basic training 
and then unleashes them into a virtual world to fight virtual  military battles.  Distributed 
for free over the internet and by direct mail, the game is rated T – suitable for players 13 
and above – by the Electronic Software Rating Board that the 1993 debates had prompted 
into existence.  The webpage for the game allows players to play over a network with up 
to thirty-one other “recruits.”  The webpage also includes a link to the U.S. Army’s 
recruitment center.
The game includes everything that Lieberman and Kohl warned against in the 
1993 hearings: graphic violence, a sophisticated upgrade of the Doom first-person 
shooter, an educational simulator of army tactics, the realistic depiction of humans from 
Mortal Kombat, and “cheat codes” that function within the game’s structure in exactly 
the same way as Mortal Kombat’s Fatality techniques.  This game is designed to be 
distributed to the children who have been protected from such material by almost a 
125 Testimony of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld , Testimony of General Richard B. Myers before 
the Senate and House Armed Services Committee, May 7, 2004.
126 Rating Video Games, 24.
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century of debate and legislation.  What distinguishes it is the way it frames violence: if a
player’s enemies correspond with the state’s enemies, violence is permissible and 
encouraged.  America’s Army provides an authorized channel for aggression in which the 
images of violence are created by the body that has the most interest in regulating and 
harvesting that aggression.
The fifteen year old Michael Robinson posted this response to America’s Army in 
an online chat board:
I doubt the next time some teenager snaps and shoots someone that when lawyers 
go into the courtrooms, and politicians meet in session, that any of them will bring 
a copy of America’s Army.  They’ll mention young minds being exposed to 
realistic violence, how irresponsible game developers, parents and the media are, 
and how “games like this should be put to an end.”  They’ll waste all the time and 
tax dollars in the world, but they won’t scrutinize their own people.127
Perhaps critics have underestimated the ability of children to understand how they are 
being manipulated, the language of repression, and their relationship to violent media and 
its power.  As the title screen to the arcade release of Mortal Kombat stated, quoting the 
Anglican bishop Jeremy Taylor, “There is no knowledge that is not power.”
127 Posted on GamersMark Network – “The US Military’s Murder Simulator,” June 6, 2002.  
http://www.gamersmark.com/editorials/view/85, accessed October 28, 2004.
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